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Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the response of monetary policymakers 
to uncertainty.  Using data for the UK since the introduction of inflation targets in 
October 1992, we find evidence that the impact of inflation on interest rates is lower 
when inflation is more uncertain and is larger when the output gap is more 
uncertain.  These findings are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical 
literature. 
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1) Introduction 
 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has recently commented that “Uncertainty is not just an 
important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape” 
(Greenspan, 2003).  This reflects the widespread acceptance of the importance of uncertainty for monetary 
policy.  However, although the impact of uncertainty on monetary policy has been extensively discussed in 
the theoretical literature, there is very little empirical evidence on how uncertainty has actually affected the 
behaviour of policymakers.  This paper attempts to provide some evidence on this by considering monetary 
policy in the UK since the introduction of inflation targets in October 1992.  We develop and estimate 
empirical models of monetary policy responses to uncertainty over this period.  
Our empirical models reflect the theoretical literature on monetary policy and 
uncertainty.  There are two main strands to this literature.  First, there are models of 
optimal monetary policy.  Although results are sensitive to model specification, most 
results conform to the Brainard (1967) principle that policymakers that dislike uncertainty 
should respond less vigorously to variables that are more uncertain.  Most work in this 
area uses a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), that is, a policy rule that relates the nominal interest 
rate to inflation and the output gap.  There is a consensus that a Taylor rule describes how 
the Fed operates and is approximately optimal (see the discussion in McCallum, 1999).  In 
the context of Taylor rules, the Brainard principle implies that the weight on inflation in the 
policy rule should be smaller when inflation is more uncertain.  Similarly, the weight on the 
output gap should be smaller when the output gap is less certain (Peersman and Smets, 
1999, Smets, 1999, Soderstrom, 2000, Rudebusch, 2001, Srour, 2003, Walsh, 2003 and 
Swanson, 2004).  Some models further predict that the weight on the output gap should be 
larger when inflation is less certain, and vice versa (Peersman and Smets, 1999 and 
Swanson, 2004). 
Our first empirical model of monetary policy and uncertainty reflects this strand of 
the literature.  We extend the familiar Taylor rule by allowing the weight on inflation in the 
policy rule to vary over time in response to changes in the volatility of inflation and the 
output gap, and similarly for the weight on the output gap.  This model allows us to test the 
proposition that greater uncertainty about inflation or the output gap reduces the response 
of policymakers to these variables, and whether greater uncertainty about one variable 
increases the response to the other. 
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The second strand of the literature on monetary policy and uncertainty analyses 
nonlinear responses to uncertainty. Meyer (1999) and Meyer et al. (2001) consider the 
effect of uncertainty about the true value of the natural rate of unemployment.  They argue 
that policymakers should act more vigorously when unemployment is clearly some way 
from the natural rate of unemployment but should become more passive as unemployment 
moves closer to possible values of the natural rate.  This argument is supported by, among 
others, Feldstein (2003) and Yellen (2003).  Although this strand of the literature focuses 
on output gap uncertainty, the arguments also apply to inflation uncertainty.  These 
arguments can therefore be generalised into the proposition that policymakers should 
respond more vigorously when variables are further from their desired or target levels, but 
that the transition to greater passivity should occur more quickly when uncertainty is 
greater. 
 Our second empirical model allows us to test this proposition.  We consider a 
nonlinear monetary policy rule in which the weights on inflation and the output gap differ 
between an “inner regime” where inflation is close to the inflation target, and an “outer 
regime” where inflation is further from the target.  The response of interest rates to inflation 
and the output gap depend on the probability of being in these regimes.  We allow 
uncertainty about inflation and the output gap to affect the probability of being in either 
regime.  If, for example, the weight on inflation is larger in the outer regime, then 
policymakers respond more vigorously to inflation when it is further from the inflation 
target.  But if uncertainty about inflation increases the probability of being in the inner 
regime, then uncertainty will make policy responses more passive.   
We estimate our models using data for the UK since the introduction of inflation 
targets in October 1992.  We focus on this period because there is evidence of frequent 
changes in monetary policy behaviour before that date (Nelson, 2003).  We first construct 
measures of uncertainty using the implied volatility from GARCH model estimates of 
inflation and the output gap.  Our estimates are plausible.  Uncertainty about inflation is 
greatest in early 1994, in the run up to the general election in May 1997, in late 2001 and 
in late 2002 and early 2003.  Uncertainty about the output gap is most marked from early 
2000 to late 2001 but is also high in early 1995.   
We then estimate our models of monetary policy and uncertainty.  There is clear 
evidence that monetary policy does respond to uncertainty and that it does so in a way that 
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supports the predictions of the theoretical literature. Estimates of the augmented Taylor 
rule show that the response of policymakers to inflation is smaller when inflation is more 
uncertain but larger when the output gap is more uncertain; this is consistent with the 
Brainard principle.  Estimates of the two-regime model confirm the findings of Martin and 
Milas (2004) that interest rates only respond to inflation in the outer regime and suggest 
that policymakers are targeting an inflation range rather than a precise target.  We further 
find that the target range is wider when inflation is more uncertain but narrower when the 
output gap is less certain (although this latter effect is not well determined).  This is 
consistent with the Meyer (1999) proposition that policymakers should respond more 
vigorously when variables are further from their target or desired levels.  Our estimates 
suggest that the average value of the target range is 1.3%-2.8%, which further confirms 
the finding of Martin and Milas (2004) that the inflation targeting regime is asymmetric. 
The remained of the paper is structured as follows.   Section 2 explains our 
methodology and describes the two models of monetary policy that we estimate.  Section 3 
presents our estimates.  Section 4 summarises our findings and offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2) Methodology 
  
Most recent models of monetary policy have used the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993).  In 
the context of the inflation targeting regime that has operated in the UK since October 
1992, the Taylor (1993) policy rule can be expressed as   
 
(1)  1* ( )
T
t t ti i E yπ y tρ π π ρ+= + − +  
 
where is the nominal interest rate, is a constanti *i 1, 1t tE π + is the inflation rate that at time t 
is expected for time (t+1), Tπ  is the inflation target,  is the output gap, y πρ  is the weight 
on inflation and yρ  is the weight on output.  In (1), interest rates are adjusted to keep 
                                                 
1 Although  is normally interpreted as the equilibrium interest rate, the equilibrium rate is not identified if 
there is an inflation target (Judd and Rudebusch, 1998) 
*i
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expected inflation close to the target and minimize the output gap; the importance of each 
objective is captured by the relative size of the relevant coefficient of the Taylor rule. 
  In practice, interest rate smoothing slows the adjustment of interest rates.  This is 
normally modeled (Judd and Rudebusch, 1998, Rudebusch, 2002 and Castelnuovo, 2003) 
using the simple partial adjustment mechanism 
 
(2)  1 ˆ(1 )t i t ii i tiρ ρ−= + −  
 
where  is the equilibrium interest rate, which is given by (1).  The resulting model is  tˆi
 
(3)   1 1(1 ){ * ( ) }
T
t i t i t t yi i i E yπρ ρ ρ π π− += + − + − + tρ
 
 In order to capture the effects of uncertainty we extend the Taylor rule as  
 
(4)   1 1(1 ){ * ( ) }
T
t it t i t t t yt ti i i E yπρ ρ ρ π π ρ− += + − + − +
 
where yit i i t i yt
π πρ ρ ρ σ ρ σ= + + , yt t ytππ π π π πρ ρ ρ σ ρ σ= + + yyt y y t y ytπ πρ ρ ρ σ ρ σ= + +,  and 
tπσ  and ytσ are measures of uncertainty over inflation and the output gap respectively.  In 
equation (4), the Taylor rule coefficients vary over time in responses to changes in 
uncertainty.  This model can be used to test whether the predictions of the literature on 
optimal responses to uncertainty are reflected in the behaviour of policymakers.  If, as the 
theoretical literature suggests, increased uncertainty leads to a more passive response to 
a variable2, then 0ππρ <  and 0yyρ < . If increased uncertainty about one variable 
strengthens the response to others, then  and .  The theoretical literature 
does not discuss the smoothing parameters, but we might expect  and .  
0yπρ > 0yπρ >
0i
πρ > 0yiρ >
Our second empirical model allows for nonlinear behaviour.  Consider the policy 
rule 
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  (5)  (1 )I Ot t t t ti M Mθ θ= + −  
 
where  
 
(6)  1 1(1 ){ ( ) }
I I I I T I
t i t i t t y tM i Eπρ ρ ρ π π− += + − − + yρ
t
 
 
(7)  1 1(1 ){ ( ) }
O O O O T O
t i t i t t yM i Eπρ ρ ρ π π− += + − − + yρ
U
t
 
 
and  
 
(8)  1{ }
L T
t t t tpr Eθ π π π π+= ≤ − ≤
 
We model (8) using the quadratic logistic function  
 
(9)  
1 1
1 - ( )( )
1{ } 1- 
1+e
T L T U
t t t t t t
L T U
t t t t t E E
pr E γ π π π π π πθ π π π π + ++ − − − −= ≤ − ≤ =  
 
This is a flexible parameterisation of the probability of being in the outer regime.  The 
curvature of the function3 is captured by the parameter γ.   Combining (5)-(8) we have 
 
(10)   1
1
( (1 ) ) (1 (1 ) )
{( (1 ) )( ) ( (1 ) ) }
I O I O
t t i t i t t i t i
I O T I
t t t t t y t y
i i
E yπ π
θ ρ θ ρ θ ρ θ ρ
θ ρ θ ρ π π θ ρ θ ρ
−
+
= + − + − − −
+ − − + + − O t
 
Equation (10) is a nonlinear monetary policy rule in which the response of policymakers to inflation 
and the output gap depends on how close inflation is to the target.  When inflation is expected to be close to 
the target, θ  is larger, the inner regime is dominant and the behaviour of policymakers if captured by the Iρ  
                                                                                                                                                                  
2 Greenspan (2003) and Yellen (2003) discuss instances where monetary policy responded more strongly to 
uncertainty.  Occasional departures from the Brainard principle can be rationalised in some cases 
(Soderstrom, 2000). 
3 θt becomes constant as γ→0 and tends to the binary function θt = 0 if Etπt+1 -πΤ < π Lt or Etπt+1 -πΤ > π Ut and θt 
=1 if π Lt < Etπt+1 -πΤ < π Ut as γ→∞  (Jansen and Teräsvirta, 1996).  
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parameters.   By contrast, behaviour is captured by the Oρ  parameters when inflation is expected to be 
further from the target.  If I Oπ πρ ρ<  and I Oy yρ ρ> , then policymakers are relatively more responsive to 
output in the inner regime and more responsive to inflation in the outer regime4. To introduce uncertainty to 
this model, we assume 
 
(11)  L L L Lt tπ π y ytπ π π σ π σ= + +  
 
and 
 
(12)  U U U Ut tπ π y ytπ π π σ π σ= + +  
 
If greater uncertainty about inflation leads to a reduced response to inflation, then  
and .  In this case, greater uncertainty widens the bounds to the inner regime 
leading, ceteris paribus, to a greater weight on the inner regime where the response to 
inflation is weaker. Meyer’s (1999) proposition that uncertainty about the output gap should 
lead policymakers to be less responsive to output corresponds to  and ; in 
this case uncertainty about output will increase the weight on the outer regime where the 
response to output is lower. 
0Uππ >
0Lππ <
0Uyπ < 0Lyπ >
 
3) Empirical Results 
 
We use quarterly UK data for 1992Q3-2003Q3.  We focus on this period because 
there is evidence of frequent changes in monetary policy behaviour before the introduction 
of inflation targets in October 1992 (Nelson, 2003).  We use the 3 month treasury bill rate 
as the nominal interest rate (this has a close relationship with the various interest rate 
instruments used over this period; see Nelson, 2003), inflation is the annual change in the 
retail price index and output is GDP.  We model the output gap as the difference between 
                                                 
4 This type of policy rule can in principle be derived using the zone preferences proposed by Orphanides and 
Weiland (2000). 
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output and a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) trend. Unit root tests show that the interest rate, 
inflation and the output gap are all stationary.  
We use the implied volatility of inflation and the output gap from GARCH models to 
measure uncertainty.  We experimented with different GARCH representations and our 
preferred specifications are reported in Table 1. For inflation, we report a Phillips curve 
with an ARCH(1) component, whereas for the output gap we report a univariate model with 
an ARCH(1) component. Notice, that the conditional variance for inflation and output are 
generated regressors that measure with noise the true but unobserved regressors (see 
e.g. Pagan, 1984 and Pagan and Ullah, 1988). The estimates can be biased and 
inconsistent if the ARCH-type models employed are misspecified. To check this, we follow 
Pagan and Ullah (1988) in testing the squared residuals of the estimated ARCH models for 
neglected serial correlation of up to order 4. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) F-test statistics 
for the ARCH model of inflation and the output gap reported at the bottom of Table 1 
suggest no evidence of misspecification. Therefore, our ARCH models capture adequately 
the conditional heteroscedasticity present in the inflation and output data for the UK.   We 
estimated a variety of other GARCH models to assess the robustness of our estimates.  
These alternative models had similar patterns of volatility, so we are confident that our 
measures of uncertainty are robust.  The volatility of inflation and the output gap are 
presented in figures 1 and 2. Uncertainty about inflation is most marked in early 1994, after 
the general election of mid-1997, in late 2001 and in late 2002 and early 2003.  Uncertainty 
about the output gap is greater from early 2000 to late 2001 and is also high in early 1995. 
 Estimates of the simple Taylor rule model of monetary policy in (3) are presented in 
column (i) of Table 2. We treat inflation and the output gap as endogenous, replacing 
expected future inflation with actual future inflation and use lagged variables as 
instruments for inflation and the output gap.  The estimates indicate that interest rates 
increase by 1.65 percentage points in response to a 1 percentage point excess of inflation 
over the inflation target and increase by 0.54 percentage points in response to a 1 
percentage point excess of output over equilibrium output (the output gap is not statistically 
significant).  The estimated residuals appear to be white noise.  However the model does 
fail the parameter stability test.  We also note that the residuals are relatively large in late 
1999 and after 2002Q1, which are periods of greater uncertainty.   
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 Estimates of the augmented Taylor rule model in (4) are presented in column (ii) of 
Table 2.  After removing insignificant effects, we obtained a simplified model whose 
estimates are presented in column (iii)5.  The inclusion of measures of uncertainty 
improves the fit of the model and the estimates in columns (ii) and (iii) pass the parameter 
stability test6.  We find that  and .  The response of interest rates to inflation 
is therefore weaker when inflation is more uncertain and stronger when the output gap is 
more uncertain (although this latter effect is not statistically significant). These effects are 
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature.  The smaller response to 
inflation when inflation is less certain is consistent with the Brainard principle, while the 
larger response to inflation when output is less certain is consistent with the predictions of 
Peersman and Smets (1999) and Swanson (2004).  
0ππρ < 0yπρ >
We also estimated models based on Dolado et al. (2002) who find that inflation uncertainty had a 
negative impact on US interest rates for 1970-79 but has had a positive effect since 1983.  Column (iv) of 
Table 2 reports estimates of  
 
(3’)  1 1(1 ){ * ( ) }
T
t i t i t t y t t y yi i i E yπ σπ π tσρ ρ ρ π π ρ ρ σ ρ σ− += + − + − + + +  
 
This equation adds measures of inflation and output gap uncertainty to the simple Taylor rule in (3).  The 
effects of uncertainty are insignificant, their inclusion does not affect estimates of the other parameters and 
this model has a higher standard error than other models and also fails the parameter stability test.  We also 
estimated a model that added inflation and output gap uncertainty to the model in (4).  We again found that 
these variables were not significant and that their inclusion did not substantially affect the estimates of the 
other parameters.  We therefore conclude that the model in (4) provides a better explanation of UK monetary 
policy. 
We next consider the nonlinear monetary policy rule in (10), estimates of which are presented in 
Table 37.  Column (i) presents estimates of a benchmark model with no uncertainty effects (imposing 
                                                 
yt
5 The average value of yt t
ππ π π π πρ ρ ρ σ ρ σ= + +  is 1.55 for the estimates in column (ii) and 1.73 for the 
estimates in column (iii).  These are similar to the estimate of πρ  in column (i), showing that introducing 
uncertainty does not affect the average estimated response to inflation. 
6 We also estimated models that imposed 0yπρ =  and both 0yπρ =  and 0yρ = .  These models 
explained the data less well than the estimates presented in Table 2.  
7 Estimates of γ are poorly determined.  This is consistent with van Dijk et al. (2002) who argue that the 
likelihood is very insensitive to this parameter. 
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0U U L Ly yπ ππ π π π= = = = ).  In initial estimates, the output gap was insignificant in the outer regime while 
inflation was insignificant in the inner regime.  We therefore imposed 0I Oyπρ ρ= = .  
The estimates suggest that policymakers only respond to inflation in the outer regime and therefore 
appear to be targeting an inflation range8 of 1.3%-2.8% rather than a precise inflation target.  The target 
range is asymmetric as the upper bound lies only 0.26% above the target of 2.5% while the lower bound is 
1.24% below the target.  Martin and Milas (2004) estimated a similar model for the shorter sample 1992Q4 to 
2000Q1. They concluded that policymakers were targeting an inflation range of 1.4%-2.6%. 
 Estimates that allow for the effects of uncertainty are presented in column (ii).  The estimates in 
column (iii) impose .  The estimates in columns (ii) and (iii) fit the data better than the 
estimates in Table 2 and all specifications pass the stability test.  The estimates of the parameters of the 
policy rules 
0U Ly yπ π= =
I
tM  and 
O
tM  are similar across Table 3.  We find that 0
Lππ <  and .  This implies that 
greater uncertainty about inflation widens the gap between the upper and lower bounds.  Ceteris paribus, 
this increases the probability of being in the inner regime and so reduces the response of interest rates to 
inflation. This is consistent with the argument of Meyer (1999) that policymakers should respond more 
vigorously to uncertain variables when they are further from their equilibrium values.   In column (ii) we find 
 and .  As with the estimates in Table 2, these estimates are, although not statistically 
significant, consistent with the proposition that greater uncertainty about the output gap implies a stronger 
response to inflation. 
0Uππ >
0Uyπ < 0Lyπ >
 We estimated a variety of alternative models in order to assess the robustness of 
our findings (these estimates are not reported but are available on request).  We measured 
uncertainty using a four-quarter moving average of our volatility measures in order to see 
whether policymakers responded to a smoother measure of uncertainty.  The estimates 
were similar but explained the data less well.  We also estimated a version of the nonlinear 
policy rule in which our uncertainty measures were included in IM and OM  as 
independent regressors.  However these were insignificant.  We also estimated models in 
which monetary policy was assumed to look more than one period ahead.  Models that 
used 2t tE π + or 3t tE π +  instead of 1t tE π +  gave similar results to those reported in Table 3, 
although the latter estimates were less well determined.  A model that used 4t tE π +  was not 
successful.  We also experimented with models that proxied the output gap using the fitted 
values of a regression of output on a quadratic trend.  The estimates are similar to those 
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reported in Tables 2 and 3, although the effect of uncertainty about the output gap is less 
well determined.  On balance, it appears that our estimates are robust. 
 Comparing Tables 2 and 3 it is apparent that our estimates have several features in common.  The effect of 
inflation is better determined than that of the output gap.  The effect of inflation uncertainty is also well determined, 
whereas the effect of uncertainty about the output gap is not.  Uncertainty about the inflation rate reduces the response 
of interest rates to inflation in both cases, while uncertainty about the output gap increases inflation response.  This 
similarity is reflected in the close relationship between the fitted values of the interest rate calculated using the estimates 
in columns (iii) of Tables 2 and 3.  The correlation between the series is 0.98 (the correlation between both fitted values 
and the actual interest rate is 0.95) and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they have the same mean and variance.  The 
difference between the series is not statistically significant and only exceeds 2 basis points in late 1997, when inflation 
is more volatile and in late 2000, when the output gap was more volatile.  In general, the model in column (iii) of Table 
3 dominates when inflation is more uncertain, while the model in column (iii) of Table 2 dominates when the output gap 
is more uncertain (this is plausible since the model in column (iii) of Table 3 excludes the effect of output gap 
uncertainty).   
We can illustrate the effects of uncertainty by using our estimates to construct counterfactual 
measures of what interest rates would have been if there had been no uncertainty.  We do this by 
constructing the fitted values of the interest rate from estimates of column (iii) of Tables 2 and 3 where we 
set 0t ytπσ σ= = .  For the model in column (iii) of Table 2, we calculate 9  
 
(13)  1 0 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ){ ( ) }
T
T i t i t ti i Eπβ ρ ρ ρ π π ρ− += + + − − + ˆ y ty)
  
where a ^ denotes the corresponding estimate in column (iii) of Table 2.  1Ti
)
  is therefore the interest rate 
implied by the estimates in column (iii) of Table 2 that would have been observed if there had been no 
uncertainty and so 0t ytπσ σ= =  for all t.  For the model in column (iii) of Table 3 we calculate  
 
(14)  
2
1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( (1 ) ) (1 (1 )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ{(1 ) ( ) }
ˆ )I O It t i t i t t i t i
O T I
t t t t y t
i i
E yπ
Oθ ρ θ ρ θ ρ θ
θ ρ π π θ ρ
−
+
= + − + − − −
− − +
ρ)
 
 
where a ^ denotes the corresponding estimate in column (iii) of Table 3 and the counterfactual regime 
weights θˆ  are calculated using ˆL Ltπ π=  and  ˆUt Uπ π= .  We cannot reject the hypothesis that 1Ti)  and 2Ti)  
have the same mean as , suggesting that uncertainty has not affected the average level of interest rates.  
However we can see from figure 3, which plots 
ti
1
Ti
)
, 2Ti
)
 and , that uncertainty has had an appreciable effect ti
                                                                                                                                                                  
T L8 The estimated lower bound is π π−
T U
=2.5-1.24=1.26% and the upper bound is 
π π+ =2.5+0.26=2.76%. 
9 This is different from using the model of column (i) of Table 2.  That model assumes policymakers ignore 
uncertainty, whereas we use a model in which policymakers respond to uncertainty and use that model to 
infer what interest rates would have been had there been no uncertainty. 
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on the pattern of interest rates over time.  Considering 1Ti
)
, we note that the largest gaps between actual and 
counterfactual interest rates occur in early 1995 (when output uncertainty was high), in late 1997 (possibly 
reflecting the South East Asian crisis that began in July 1997), in early 1999 (possibly reflecting the Russian 
crisis of mid-late 1998 or the introduction of the Euro in January 1999) and in late 2001 (reflecting the events 
of September 11 2001 and possibly the US economic situation).  These differences are less marked in the 
case of 2Ti
)
, but the effects of uncertainty are clear in early 1999 and since late 2001. 
 
 
4) Conclusions 
 
This paper has estimated the impact of uncertainty on monetary policy using data 
for the UK since the introduction of inflation targets in October 1992, using two rather 
different models.  We have found clear evidence that monetary policy has been affected by 
uncertainty and that these effects are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical 
literature.  Both models suggested similar effects from uncertainty.  We related the effects 
of uncertainty to the 1997 Asian crisis, the Russian crisis of 1998, the introduction of the 
Euro in 1999, the slowdown in the US economy over the past few years and the terrorist 
attacks on September 11 2001.  
Our work can be extended in a number of ways.  This approach can be applied to 
other countries in order to see whether there is a clear pattern in the response of monetary 
policy to uncertainty.  Monetary policy can also be allowed to respond to other influences.  
It would be interesting to analyse the response of monetary policy to uncertainty over the 
exchange rate and asset prices, especially house prices.  We intend to address these 
issues in future work. 
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 Table 1 
Implied volatility models 
 
Inflation model:  2 110
2
01 , −− +=++= tttttt y εωωσεγππ π
Output gap model:  2 110
2
443322110 , −−−−− +=+++++= tyttttttt yyyyy ηφφσηδδδδδ
 
 Inflation  Output gap  
   
γ0   0.197 (0.083)  
ω0   0.291 (0.079)  
ω1   0.253 (0.130)  
   
δ0     -0.026 (0.034) 
δ1      1.325 (0.168) 
δ2     -0.592 (0.264) 
δ3      0.551 (0.207) 
δ4     -0.420 (0.112) 
φ0      0.047 (0.015) 
φ1      0.622 (0.310) 
   
Neglected 
ARCH 
 1.14 [0.35]     0.82 [0.52] 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of 
the estimates. Neglected ARCH is the Lagrange Multiplier 
F test on the squared residuals for remaining serial 
correlation of order 4. Numbers in square brackets are the 
probability values of the test statistics. 
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Table 2 
Estimates of Augmented Taylor Rules 
0 1
1
( )
(1 )
{( )( )
( ) }
y
t i i t i yt t
y
i i t i yt
y T
t yt t t
y
y y t y yt t
i i
E
y
π π
π π
ππ π π π
π π
β ρ ρ σ ρ σ
ρ ρ σ ρ σ
ρ ρ σ ρ σ π π
ρ ρ σ ρ σ
−
+
= + + +
+ − − −
+ + −
+ + +
 
Sample: 1992Q4-2003Q3 
IV Estimates 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
     
0β    1.244 (0.323)    1.150 (0.313)    1.143 (0.293)    1.719 (0.729) 
iρ    0.762 (0.056)    0.865 (0.115)    0.773 (0.051)    0.764 (0.056) 
i
πρ     -0.156 (0.195)     
y
iρ      0.020 (0.149)       
πρ   1.646 (0.484)     9.532 (4.082)   11.700 (4.431)    1.451 (0.430) 
ππρ   -16.869 (7.257) -19.660 (7.949)  
yπρ      7.036 (3.983)    5.950 (3.890)  
yρ   0.540 (0.466)    3.152 (4.756)    0.540 (0.453)    0.644 (0.479) 
y
πρ     -2.216 (7.237)   
y
yρ     -3.883 (5.317)   
σπρ       -3.237 (4.560) 
yσρ       -0.399 (3.165) 
     
Adjust. R2  0.873  0.886  0.906  0.870 
s.e.  0.380  0.360  0.351  0.386 
AIC  0.987  0.999  0.862  1.062 
AR  2.08 [0.09]  0.61 [0.69]  1.97 [0.85]  2.18 [0.08] 
Het  1.18 [0.34]  0.49 [0.92]  0.83 [0.61]  1.10 [0.39] 
ARCH  0.56 [0.68]  2.03 [0.12]  1.86 [0.14]   0.55 [0.69] 
Norm  0.05 [0.97]  1.53 [0.46]  0.19 [0.91]   0.01 [0.99] 
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Parameter 
stability 
 5.63 [0.00]  1.81 [0.11]  2.44 [0.06]  2.91 [0.03] 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. s.e. is the 
regression standard error. AIC is the Akaike information criterion. AR is the Lagrange 
Multiplier F test for residual serial correlation of up to fourth order. Het is an F test for 
heteroscedasticity. ARCH is the fourth order Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
F test. Norm is a Chi-square test for normality. Parameter stability is an F test of parameter 
stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 1996). Numbers in 
square brackets are the probability values of the test statistics. 
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Table 3 
Estimates of quadratic logistic model 
 
0 (1 )
I O
t t t ti Mθ θ θ= + + − tM
t
 
  1 1(1 ){ ( ) }
I I I I T I
t i t i t t yM i Eπρ ρ ρ π π− += + − − + yρ
t
 
  1 1(1 ){ ( ) }
O O O O T O
t i t i t t yM i Eπρ ρ ρ π π− += + − − + yρ  
1 1- ( )( )
11- 
1+e
T L T U
t t t t t t
t E Eγ π π π π π πθ + +− − − −=  
L L L L
t tπ π y ytπ π π σ π σ= + +  
U U U U
t tπ π y ytπ π π σ π σ= + +  
 
Sample: 1992Q4-2003Q3 
Nonlinear IV Estimates 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
    
0θ    1.181 (0.346)   1.577 (0.291)   1.482 (0.300) 
I
iρ    0.748 (0.063)   0.683 (0.052)   0.698 (0.054) 
Iπρ       
I
yρ    0.710 (0.534)   0.604 (0.297)   0.878 (0.298) 
O
iρ    0.775 (0.066)   0.723 (0.051)   0.742 (0.055) 
Oπρ    1.830 (0.581)   1.971 (0.383)   1.962 (0.436) 
O
yρ           
Lπ  -1.240 (0.580)  -1.080 (0.056)  -1.080 (0.056) 
Lππ    -0.320 (0.024)  -0.320 (0.023) 
L
yπ     0.861 (0.453)   
Uπ    0.255 (0.028)   0.256 (0.038)   0.256 (0.038) 
Uππ     0.732 (0.058)   0.664 (0.020) 
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U
yπ    -0.154 (0.101)   
γ  90.217 (100.22)  94.200 (100.21)  94.200 (100.21) 
    
Adjust. R2   0.884   0.902   0.902 
s.e.   0.377   0.328   0.333 
AIC   0.976   0.717   0.747 
AR   2.99 [0.03]   2.26 [0.07]   2.30 [0.07] 
Het   1.19 [0.34]   0.68 [0.73]   0.75 [0.64] 
ARCH   0.83 [0.51]   0.33 [0.85]   0.35 [0.84] 
Norm   1.05 [0.59]   1.21 [0.55]   0.08 [0.96] 
Parameter 
stability 
  0.98 [0.47]   0.61 [0.82]   0.95 [0.45] 
Notes: See the notes of Table 2. Following Teräsvirta (1994), the γ parameter is made 
dimension-free by dividing it by the variance of Etπt+1. 
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 Figure 1 
The volatility of Inflation 
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Figure 2 
The volatility of the output gap 
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Figure 3 
Fitted 1Ti
)
 and 2Ti
)
 interest rates against the actual interest rate 
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